Injunctive Relief for Trademark Infringement--The Second Circuit Misses the Mark: Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel by Alimonti, Frederick P.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 62 
Number 2 Volume 62, Winter 1988, Number 2 Article 4 
June 2012 
Injunctive Relief for Trademark Infringement--The Second Circuit 
Misses the Mark: Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie 
Channel 
Frederick P. Alimonti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Alimonti, Frederick P. (1988) "Injunctive Relief for Trademark Infringement--The Second Circuit Misses the 
Mark: Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 62 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol62/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
COMMENTS
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT - THE SECOND
CIRCUIT MISSES THE MARK: HOME BOX
OFFICE v. SHOWTIME/THE MOVIE
CHANNEL
The modern cause of action for trademark infringement has
its origins in common law tort concepts of unfair competition.1
Trademark infringement actions are governed by the Trademark
Act of 19462 ("the Lanham Act"), which is intended to protect the
1 See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) (trademark
law "but a part of the broader law of unfair competition"); United States Ozone Co. v.
United States Ozone Co. of Am., 62 F.2d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 1932) (comparing trademark
principles to those of unfair competition); Thomas Kerfoot & Co. v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 59
F.2d 80, 82 (D. Mass. 1932) (trademark infringement and unfair competition essentially the
same wrong); see also 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPIMTION § 5:2, at 133-35
(1984) (origins of infringement action). The cause of action for infringement has its origin in
the common law tort of "passing off" or "palming off." See, e.g., Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet
"16" Shop, 15 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 1926) (discussing infringement and palming off); Kroll
Bros. v. Rolls-Royce, 126 F.2d 495, 497 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (trademark law aimed at preventing
passing off); see also 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra, § 25:1, at 232-40 (discussing passing off). This
terminology resulted from the fact that a party's trademark or trade name was viewed as a
property right, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that its competitor had affirmatively
"passed off" his competing goods as those of the plaintiff-originator. See The Trademark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92-93 (1879) (discussing common law right of property in trademark);
Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 876, 877 (1948); cf.
American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1900) (plaintiff
had no exclusive property right in common name "aluminum," and so had no infringement
claim despite fact that defendant was utilizing name to falsely describe his non-aluminum
product); New York & R. Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F. 277, 279 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1890) (area manufacturers could not assert property right in town name when name was
falsely used to designate defendant's out of town product, since no exclusive right to use
town name existed).
' Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The Lanham Act, a statutory compilation of existing federal trademark statutes, was
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originator of a trademark or tradename from both illegal infringe-
ment3 and the unfair competition that results from such infringe-
ment.4 In furtherance of these goals, the Lanham Act empowers
the first federal law to clearly create a federal right in trademarks. See, e.g., S.C. Johnson &
Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.) (Lanham Act creates federally sanctioned civil
liability), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); 1 A. SEmIL, S. DUBROFF & E. GONDA, TRADEMARK
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.11, at 29-30 (1963); see also Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986) (construction and intent of Lanham Act).
' See Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982) (discussing
scope of modem infringement action); Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Met-
ric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 713-15 (8th Cir. 1980) (purpose of section 43(a)); Lanham Act §
43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act states in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services ... a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce... shall be
liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indi-
cated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such
false description or representation.
Id.
The Lanham Act defines trademark as "includ[ing] any word, name, symbol, or device
or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by
others." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The Act provides that a trade name can include "names and surnames, firm names and
trade names" of manufacturers, merchants, and other businesses that serve to identify that
business. See id. Hence, the term "trade name" generally refers to an actual business entity,
while "trademark" identifies a particular product or service. See, e.g., In re Pennsylvania
Fashion Factory, 588 F.2d 1343, 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (distinguishing trademark and trade
name under Lanham Act); 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 4:4, at 125-27; see also ANDUR,
TRADEMARK LAW & PRACTICE § 4 (1962) (distinguishing trademark and trade name).
4 See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 45 provides,
in pertinent part, that among the Act's purposes is "to protect persons engaged in ...
commerce against unfair competition [and] to prevent fraud and deception in ... commerce
by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered
marks." Id.
Early interpretations of the Lanham Act restricted the cause of action for infringement
to previous common law parameters. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186
F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951) (no cause of action without showing an injury to property
through "passing off"); Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D.
Mass. 1949) (advocating limiting cause of action under section 43(a) to "passing off" cases),
aff'd, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950); see also supra note 1 (discussing common law infringe-
ment action).
In 1954, in a major Lanham Act decision, the Third Circuit deviated from the common
law approach to trademark infringement. See L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,
214 F.2d 649, 651-54 (3d Cir. 1954). The L'Aiglon court read section 43(a) of the Act as
creating a federal tort cause of action capable of enforcement by various plaintiffs. Id. at
651; Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). In L'Aiglon, the plaintiff sought relief
from defendant's use of a picture of the plaintiff's expensive product in advertisements for
defendant's less expensive product. Id. at 650. The Third Circuit held that the common law
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the courts to grant injunctive relief mandating discontinuance of a
party's infringing use.' The decision as to the appropriateness of
requirement of "palming off" need not be proven under the Lanham Act. Id. at 651. The
court suggested that the Lanham Act might "reflect[] the ... viewpoint ... of the Restate-
ment of Torts." See id. Section 761 of the Restatement, which was quoted by the L'Aiglon
court, provided for civil liability of a party who deliberately and falsely represented his
goods as having the qualities of another's. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 761 (1939).
The L'Aiglon court further held that a violation of section 43(a) provides an indepen-
dent basis for federal jurisdiction without any diversity or amount in controversy require-
ment. L'Aiglon, 214 F.2d at 651. Other circuits have since adopted the L'Aiglon court's
view of the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Alum-a-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441
F.2d 556, 557 (5th Cir. 1971) (section 43(a) provides independent grounds of federal juris-
diction); see also Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educ. & Coop. Union, 247 F.2d 809, 819
(8th Cir. 1957) (same).
Decisions since L'Aiglon have followed that court's lead and extended the protection of
section 43(a) by broadly construing the language of the statute. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (section 43(a) cause of
action requires neither "literal or obvious falsehood," nor "intent to deceive"). For example,
the phrase "false designation of origin" has been construed to apply not only to geographic
location, but also to various aspects of a good's origin. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Bis-
cuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980) (false designation "has been broadly construed
to encompass instances of one competitor 'palming off' his goods as those of another by
means of confusing packaging or labeling of his product"); Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings v.
Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 1963) (definition of origin extends beyond geographic
location to identity of manufacturer); Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
"False description" has also been substantially expanded to include descriptions that
are misleading or likely to deceive. See Proctor & Gamble, 747 F.2d at 119 (section 43(a)
applied not only to literal falsehoods, but also to ambiguity and "innuendo"); Vidal Sassoon,
Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); American Home Prods.
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978) (same); Lanham Act § 43(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982); see also Allison, Private Cause of Action for Unfair Competition
Under the Lanham Act, 14 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 11 (1976) (a "literally true" statement is action-
able if deceptive); Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. Rav. 671, 691-93 (1983) (examples of
various forms of "false advertising").
Courts have also recently held that, in line with the purpose of protecting businesses
from false advertising, section 43(a) is also intended to prevent confusion in the minds of
consumers as to the origin of goods. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799
F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
1 See Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (authority of courts hear-
ing actions under act to grant injunctions).
The primary rationale behind a preliminary injunction is to prevent a party from incur-
ring further damages before trial on the merits, thus preserving the court's ability to admin-
ister appropriate relief. See Tri-State Generation v. Shoshone River Power, 805 F.2d 351,
355 (10th Cir. 1986) (purpose of preliminary injunction to preserve status quo and "power to
render a meaningful decision"); United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1459 (11th Cir.)
(purpose to prevent irreparable injury and maintain court's ability to administer relief),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1287 (1986); 4 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR Com'ETroN, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 22.36, at 171 (4th ed. 1983) (general discussion of preliminary injunction in
trademark cases). Such protection might be particularly essential in a case involving unfair
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such a remedy is a matter of substantial judicial discretion at the
trial level.' Trial courts may permit a party to continue use of a
protected name or mark provided an appropriate disclaimer,
designed to avoid consumer confusion, is utilized.7 On review, an
competition, where a competitor may be deliberately seeking to damage the reputation of
the competing plaintiff. See id.
Since an injunction seeks to prevent further damage by the defendant, it logically fol-
lows that proof of "likelihood of irreparable harm" is part of the plaintiff's burden of proof.
See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (possibility of adequate money damages or
corrective relief weigh heavily against injunctive relief); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456
(1973) (irreparable harm proper part of district court's test for injunctive relief); Bucking-
ham Corp. v. Karp, 762 F.2d 257, 262 (2d Cir. 1985) (irreparable injury is "linchpin" of
preliminary injunction requirements). Additionally, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or, at least, a "sufficiently seri-
ous question going to the merits" with the "balance of hardships" falling on the plaintiff.
Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Jack-
son Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). See generally 4 R.
CALLMAN, supra, §§ 22.36-22.39 (discussing preliminary injunction in trademark cases); 2 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 30:15-30:18 (same).
I See Lanham Act § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (Supp. IV 1986). The Lanham Act specifically
provides for wide latitude in framing equitable remedies: "[The courts] shall have power to
grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court
may deem reasonable." Id. This wide latitude given the district courts has as its basis the
equitable nature of the remedy and the equitable principle that the "nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy." Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 16 (1971); see also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (equitable injunc-
tive relief not matter of right but within courts' discretion).
See Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 724 F.2d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 1983)
(conspicuous disclaimer adequate to avoid confusion); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry
Corp., 441 F. Supp. 1220, 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (requiring prominently displayed disclaimer
to lessen likelihood of future confusion), aff'd, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1116 (1979). The basis for injunctive relief under the Lanham Act is a showing of a
likelihood of confusion regarding the source of the infringing party's product. Lanham Act
§§ 32(1), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (1982); see Standard & Poors Corp. v. Com-
modity Exch., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982). It follows that a disclaimer capable of elimi-
nating this confusion should, in theory, be an adequate remedy. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Cos-
metics v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d 665, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1987) (disclaimer adequate
to alleviate consumer confusion); Frisch's Restaurant v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 650
(6th Cir.) (disclaimer adequate to remedy "false impressions"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916
(1982); Stormer v. Johnson, 587 F. Supp. 275, 280 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (disclaimer utilized in
preliminary injunction to protect plaintiff without unduly injuring defendant).
The granting of a limited injunction which provides for a disclaimer presents a complex
issue for appellate review. If viewed as within the trial court's discretionary authority, such
an injunction should not be disturbed absent a finding of abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 832 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that
disclaimer-based injunction not abuse of discretion); Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668-69 (cir-
cuit court cannot reverse preliminary injunction absent "erroneous factual determination,
an error of law or an abuse of discretion"); see also Spring Mills, 689 F.2d at 1136 (task of
devising injunction to remove confusion left to district court).
If attacked as inadequate to alleviate the likelihood of confusion between the goods
involved, the sufficiency of a disclaimer might be reviewed as a question of law, fact, or both,
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appellate court may not generally reverse or modify such a deter-
mination without first finding that the district court abused its dis-
cretion.' Recently, in Home Box Office, Inc. v. ShowtimelThe
Movie Channel, Inc.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed a district court's decision granting a pre-
liminary injunction under the Lanham Act, but vacated the lower
court's determination to allow the use of materials containing a
disclaimer.10
In Home Box Office, defendant Showtime, a cable television
subscription service, had commenced an advertising campaign
prominently utilizing the mark of its competitor, plaintiff Home
Box Office ("HBO")." Showtime claimed that its new advertising
was intended to demonstrate that Showtime and HBO each offered
exclusive programs and, therefore, were complementary, albeit
depending upon how the particular circuit views the confusion question. Compare
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enters., 774 F.2d 1144, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (likelihood
of confusion as question of law) with Louisiana World Exposition v. Logue, 746 F.2d 1033,
1039 (5th Cir. 1984) (likelihood of confusion as a question of fact) and Plus Prods. v. Plus
Discount Foods, 722 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1983) (determinations as to individual fac-
tors causing likelihood of confusion are questions of fact; balancing of these factors is ques-
tion of law).
For recent criticism of the efficacy of the disclaimer remedy, see generally Jacoby &
Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation: More Trouble Than They are
Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35 (1986); Radin, Disclaimers as a Remedy for Trademark
Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 59 (1986).
8 See, e.g., Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1987)
(abuse of discretion is "serious error of judgment"); Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968,
970 (8th Cir. 1984) (abuse of discretion occurs when district court ignores relevant factors,
considers irrelevant factors, or improperly weighs relevant factors); see also Founding
Church of Scientology v. Webster, 802 F.2d 1448, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing rationale
for giving deference to the trial court), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 199 (1987); Friendly, Indis-
cretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 773-78 (1982) (discussing approaches to abuse
of discretion within various circuits). Judge Friendly noted that appellate courts will often
avoid having to deal with the "abuse of discretion" issue by determining that the lower
court based its determination upon an "erroneous view of the law." See id. at 776.
Despite the variation in interpretation, the circuits generally apply the "abuse of discre-
tion" standard when reviewing Lanham Act injunctions. See, e.g., Stormy Clime Ltd. v.
Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure to apply correct legal standard
was abuse of discretion); United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 141-
42 (3d Cir. 1981) (trial court's denial of preliminary injunction was abuse of discretion);
Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 1979) (granting of limited in-
junction was abuse of discretion as limits of injunction negated its benefits).
9 832 F.2d 1311 (2d Cir. 1987).
1o See id. at 1317.
1' Id. at 1313. The registered trademark "HBO" had been used regularly by Home Box
Office in its own advertising and preceded all Home Box Office presentations. Id.
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competitive, services.' 2 Showtime maintained that its new slogan,
"SHOWTIME & HBO. It's Not Either/Or Anymore," and several
permutations thereof, made this relationship clear."3 Showtime uti-
lized various physical and electronic media to communicate these
slogans."4 To prevent continued use of its mark, HBO brought suit
under the Lanham Act and moved for a preliminary injunction al-
leging, inter alia, unfair competition and trademark infringe-
ment." The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted the motion, and enjoined Showtime's further
use of the slogan.'6 In framing the injunction, the court provided
that the slogans could be used if accompanied by an appropriate
disclaimer.'7 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district
court lacked sufficient evidence upon which to base its determina-
tion of disclaimer adequacy, and vacated the portion of that order
which limited the injunction. 8
Writing for the Home Box Office court, Judge Lumbard af-
firmed the district court's determination of "likelihood of confu-
sion," as well as the lower court's holding as to the appropriateness
of injunctive relief.19 Judge Lumbard, however, disagreed with the
12 Id. at 1314-15. Showtime also claimed that it intended the use of the "HBO" mark in
its campaign to "differentiate the two services and ... not to suggest any link between
them." Id. at 1314.
13 Id. at 1313-14. The other slogans were: "THE MOVIE CHANNEL & HBO. It's Not
Either/Or Anymore;" "SHOWTIME & HBO. Together is Better;" "Why SHOWTIME &
HBO make such a perfect pair;" and "Play the Showtine PERFECT (HBO, Showtime)
PAIR Instant Winner Game." Id. at 1313.
14 Id. at 1313. The new campaign was introduced at the National Cable Television As-
sociation Convention in May of 1987. Id. The means utilized in presenting the slogan to
conventioneers included an outdoor billboard, a hot air balloon, a rolling billboard, promo-
tional video tapes, assorted signs, promotional pens, tote bags, sunglasses, buttons, and
cookies. Id.
15 Id.; see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (discussion of Lanham Act).
18 Home Box Office v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 665 F. Supp. 1079, 1086
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 832 F.2d 1311 (2d Cir. 1987).
17 See id. at 1087. The district court also found that new promotional materials
presented by Showtime at the hearing contained adequate disclaimers. Id. at 1085-86. HBO
objected to the lower court's consideration of these promotional materials on the grounds
that it (HBO) had not been given adequate notice that they would be presented to the
court. Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1312-13; see infra note 18.
18 See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1316. The circuit court based this determination,
in part, on its holding that HBO had not received adequate notice of the materials that
Showtime introduced at the hearing. See id. at 1315.
" See id. at 1314-15. The Home Box Office court agreed with the district court's con-
clusion that continued use of the slogan was likely to cause consumer confusion and stated
that this factor, "coupled with the likelihood that HBO will also succeed on the merits,
makes a preliminary injunction the proper remedy." Id. at 1315; see supra note 5 (tests for
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
district court's conclusions as to the efficacy of Showtime's pro-
posed disclaimers, holding that the burden of proof was upon
Showtime "to demonstrate that any proposed materials [utilizing
the disclaimer] would significantly reduce the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion," and that Showtime had failed to carry this bur-
den.20 Judge Lumbard stated that allocating the burden of proof to
the defendant on this issue served four valuable functions.21 First,
such an allocation acknowledged that HBO had sufficiently
demonstrated that consumer confusion was likely to result from
the use of Showtime's slogans.22 Second, it recognized that Show-
time had infringed on HBO's trademark and could not continue to
do so.25 Third, HBO was relieved from having to demonstrate a
likelihood of confusion each time Showtime developed a new dis-
claimer.24 Lastly, such an allocation was consistent with the court's
interpretation of the Lanham Act's purpose to protect both the
holders of trademarks and consumers.25
Although the Home Box Office court presented a thoughtful
analysis regarding allocation of the burden of proof, it is submitted
that the Second Circuit failed to adequately define its grounds for
vacating the district court's decision. The cost of this failure was
the loss of an opportunity to establish a definitive analysis for Lan-
ham Act trademark infringement cases at both the trial and appel-
late level. This Comment will outline appropriate methodology
whereby the Home Box Office rule can be combined with previ-
ously delineated criteria in order to establish such an analysis.
issuing preliminary injunctions).
'0 See id. at 1316. Supporting this shift in burden of proof as to the adequacy of pro-
posed disclaimers, Judge Lumbard relied on authority from other circuits in which disclaim-
ers were held to be inadequate. Id. at 1315; see United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia
Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981) (disclaimer inadequate considering high risk of
confusion involved); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flescher, 605 F.2d 1130, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 1979)
(making grammatical distinctions between marks held insufficient to remedy confusion).
The court further noted a general dissatisfaction among legal scholars with the adequacy of
disclaimer remedies. See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1315-16. See generally Jacoby &
Raskopf, supra note 7, at 54 (discussing adequacy of disclaimer remedies and alternatives);
Radin, supra note 7, at 72 (same).
11 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
22 See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1316.
21 See id. The court explained that the imposition of this burden on the defendant
would prevent Showtime from utilizing the HBO trademark unless Showtime could demon-
strate that its use was no longer infringing. See id.
" See id.
2 See id. at 1316-17.
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THE TRIAL LEVEL: TESTS AND REMEDIES
Before granting a motion for a preliminary injunction, a dis-
trict court in the Second Circuit must determine that the movant
has demonstrated both a "likelihood of success on the merits" and
a probability of irreparable harm if the motion is denied.26 As ap-
plied to Lanham Act infringement cases, both requirements are
deemed satisfied when the movant shows that the other party's use
of its mark has caused a high likelihood of confusion among con-
sumers as to the origin of the goods or services involved.", Most
circuits have treated the determination of likelihood of confusion
as either solely a question of law or solely a question of fact.28 The
Second Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach, however, holding
that while the determination as to the various factors utilized in
Lanham Act analysis with regard to the specific facts of each case
is a question of fact,2 9 the weighing of these various factors and the
28 See supra note 5; see also Kaplan v. Board of Educ., 759 F.2d 256, 259 (2d Cir. 1985)
(describing two-prong test); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568, 569
(2d Cir. 1981) (same). Other circuits utilize a similar test. See, e.g., Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (four-prong test featuring Second
Circuit elements); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1228 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); SI
Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985) (same). See generally 4 R.
CALLMAN, supra note 5, § 22.36, at 171-72 (comparison of various circuits' tests); Mulligan,
Preliminary Injunction in the Second Circuit, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 831, 833-39 (1977)
(evolution of preliminary injunction tests).
In deciding on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a federal court generally considers
the following factors: probability of success, risk of irreparable harm, the effectiveness of the
injunction in preserving the status quo as it existed prior to the dispute, and the effect of
the injunction in protecting third parties. See Foundation on Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at
151; In re DeLorean, 755 F.2d at 1228; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:15, at 483. McCar-
thy suggests that despite variation among the circuits, all of the courts "either explicitly or
implicitly" include these factors. Id.
27 See Lobo Enters. v. Tunnel, Inc., 822 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1987) (utilizing likeli-
hood of confusion test). In determining the likelihood of confusion, the court need not re-
quire evidence of the occurrence of actual confusion. See id. However, some form of sub-
stantive evidence beyond the subjective belief of the moving party must be offered to prove
the likelihood that consumers will be misled. See Coca-Cola v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d
312, 316-17 (2d Cir. 1982) (advocating use of market surveys to prove likelihood of confu-
sion); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (market
studies admissible as evidence).
2' The majority of the circuits treat likelihood of confusion as a question of fact. See,
e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 661-62 (10th Cir. 1987); Scandia
Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427-28 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1147 (1986); Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., 716 F.2d 833, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1983); 2
J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:22, at 107-08. The Federal Circuit still seems to maintain
that likelihood of confusion is a question of law. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas
Enters., 774 F.2d 1144, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29 See Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, 722 F.2d 999, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1983). The
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ultimate conclusion as to likelihood of confusion is a question of
law.30 The factors to be utilized in making such a determination
were first set forth by the Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Po-
larad Electronics Corp."'
The Polaroid court listed eight factors to be weighed when de-
termining the likelihood of consumer confusion among seemingly
noncompeting products.3 2 Such factors include the strength of the
complainant's mark, the similarity between the two marks in-
volved, the proximity of the products in the marketplace, evidence
of actual consumer confusion between two marks, the alleged in-
fringing party's good faith in adopting the complainant's mark,
and the sophistication of the buyers in the markets involved. 3
Originally, these factors were applied to noncompeting goods that
occupied different markets. 34 However, the modern trend has been
to extend their use to cases where the goods were, at least argua-
bly, in direct competition. 5
Third and Ninth Circuits also view the ultimate conclusion as to the likelihood of confusion
as a question of law, but the analysis of the factors underlying this conclusion as a question
of fact. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219 F.2d 590, 591 (3d Cir. 1955). Recently, in denying certiorari
to an infringement decision, the Supreme Court passed up an opportunity to define the
nature of the "likelihood of confusion" question. See Elby's Big Boy v. Frisch's Restaurants,
459 U.S. 916, 916 (1982). Justice White dissented to the denial on the ground that the Court
should have settled "the split in the lower courts." Id. at 916-17 (White, J., dissenting).
Whether a particular question is treated as a question of "law" or "fact" is of substan-
tial importance on appeal in the federal courts. "[F]indings of fact... shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added); see Inwood Laboratories
v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (appellate court must accept factual findings
unless left with "definite and firm conviction that a mistake" was made). On the other hand,
if a lower court's finding is reviewed as a question of "law," an appellate court need not
defer to the trial court's conclusion. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir.
1972) (question of law subject to de novo review), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
11 See Plus Prods., 722 F.2d at 1004-05; see also Charles of the Ritz Group v. Quality
King Distribs., 832 F.2d 1317, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987) (lower court's findings of likelihood of
confusion a "legal conclusion"); 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:22, at 109-10 (comparing
various circuits' approaches).
31 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
3' See id.
3 Id. at 495. Judge Friendly, after listing the factors, went on to observe that "[elven
this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities-the court may have to take still
other variables into account." Id.
" See id.
" See, e.g., Charles of the Ritz Group v. Quality King Distribs., 832 F.2d 1317, 1321-23
(2d Cir. 1987) (Polaroid factors utilized in comparing two similar perfumes in different price
ranges); Lobo Enters. v. Tunnel, Inc., 822 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1987) (factors used in com-
paring large night club with more exclusive gay club); Lois Sportswear U.S.A. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873-76 (2d Cir. 1986) (comparing designer and non-designer
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None of the Polaroid factors are considered individually deter-
minative; rather, they are intended to be balanced together."8 The
"strength of the mark" factor has been subject to considerable ju-
dicial examination, and a hierarchy of trademark categories exists
for purposes of its analysis, with each category in the hierarchy
subject to a different degree of protection.3 7 In ascending order,
according to the level of protection they are afforded, these catego-
ries are generic, 38 descriptive,39 suggestive,40 and arbitrary or fanci-
blue jeans); Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1981) (different snack
chips sharing some competing uses). The Vitarroz court stated that "[s]ince the Polaroid
decision, we have consistently considered all the Polaroid factors... despite the similarity
of the marks and the close proximity of the products." Id. at 966; cf. Standard & Poor's
Corp. v. Commodity Exch., 683 F.2d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 1982) (Polaroid-like list utilized in
comparing exact copying of plaintiff's service). But see Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc.,
809 F.2d 971, 973-79 (2d Cir. 1987) (Polaroid factors not utilized in comparing similar rain
jackets).
" See Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, 722 F.2d 999, 1004 (2d Cir. 1983); Lever
Bros. v. American Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1982); Vitarroz, 644 F.2d at 966.
"No single Polaroid factor is determinative. Rather each must be considered in the context
of all of the other factors, and from a balance of these determinations, one is able to reach
the ultimate conclusion, whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the two parties'
products." Plus Prods., 722 F.2d at 1004.
" See Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (2d Cir.
1982); McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131-32 (2d Cir. 1979). See
generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(early Second Circuit discussion of various categories for examining mark's distinctive
qualities).
38 See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. "A generic term is one that refers, or has come to be
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species." Id. There
is no trademark protection for terms which are in the generic category because such protec-
tion "would grant the owner of the mark a monopoly, since a competitor could not describe
his goods as what they are." CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, 531 F.2d 11, 13
(2d Cir. 1975).
The test for determining whether a particular mark is generic is whether the mark's
"primary significance in the minds of potential buyers is the identification of a product
category rather than a producer's brand name." Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic
Words, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 206, 211 (1980) (footnote omitted); see also Telemed Corp. v.
Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1978) (generic term is "name or description of a
kind of goods"). See generally 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 12:1-12:8, at 520-47 (discus-
sion of generic category and its history).
3 See 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1984). Trademarks which simply describe the product or its
purpose are "descriptive." See id.; 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:5, at 442-43. Protec-
tion to "descriptive" marks is only granted when the user of the mark can show that he has
managed to evoke in consumers a recognition of "secondary meaning" in the mark as being
the mark of the specific maker. See American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609
F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1979); 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, §
11:9, at 453-54, 457 (amount of secondary meaning evidence required increases as mark be-
comes more descriptive); infra note 41 (discussion of secondary meaning).
40 See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11; Stix Prods. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F.
Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A "suggestive mark" differs from a purely "descriptive
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ful.4 1 Since a given trademark may not always fall clearly into one
of these categories, the Second Circuit has suggested that these
categories should simply serve as guidelines for the ultimate deter-
mination of "distinctiveness." '42 Once evaluated, the strength of the
mark" in that "it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to
the nature of goods." Id. at 488.
"1 See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12. A "fanciful" term is generally one that is "in-
vented solely for [its] use as" a trademark, while an arbitrary term is a word of common
usage that "is applied in an unfamiliar way." Id.; see, e.g., Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal,
Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 610 (2d Cir.) ("Haymaker" fanciful or arbitrary as applied to women's
shoes), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960). It is difficult to distinguish between "arbitrary"
and "suggestive" marks and both "fall within the same legal pigeon hole of classification in
that neither category requires proof of secondary meaning for legal protection." 1 J. McCAR-
THY, supra note 1, § 11:4, at 440; cf. Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.
1948) (fanciful trade name entitled to greater protection than non-fanciful ones).
The relationship between the mark and the particular product to which it is applied
may be crucial in determining the nature of the mark. See American Home Prods. v. John-
son Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1978). In a clever opinion determining the distinc-
tiveness of the mark "ROACH MOTEL," Judge Gurfein stated, "While roaches may live in
some motels... motels are surely not built for roaches .... Hence the mark is fanciful in
conception. Indeed, its very incongruity is what catches one's attention." Id. at 106. It is not
uncommon for a given trademark to shift among categories over time as the mark acquires
or loses its distinctive character or a secondary meaning attaches. See American Footwear,
609 F.2d at 663. "Secondary meaning" refers to the meaning which consumers attach to an
originally descriptive mark as signifying the goods of a specific manufacturer. See id.; J.
CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPErrION § 2.01, at 87-88 (1970); 1 A. SEI.EL, S.
DUBROFF & E. GONDA, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE § 17.01, at 449 (1963). A mark is
deemed to have acquired a secondary meaning if the user of the mark can demonstrate
"that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the
product but the producer." Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938); see
20th Century Wear, 747 F.2d at 90.
Just as usage and association may cause a mark to acquire a secondary meaning, enti-
tling the term to protection, so too may common usage strip a mark of its distinctive nature.
See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963) (com-
mon usage of term "thermos" caused mark to become generic); see also 1 J. McCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 12:3 (listing various original brand names that have been held to be generic).
The Lanham Act specifically provides for cancellation of a mark's registration when the
mark becomes generic in nature. See Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
42 See Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, 722 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1983). The Plus
Products court stated that although such a "classification system is a helpful tool in concep-
tualizing this somewhat amorphous subject, it is not determinative, for the strength of a
mark 'depends ultimately on its distinctiveness or its "origin-indicating" quality in the eyes
of the purchasing public.'" Id. (quoting McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d
1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)).
The court in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. recognized that "[tihe
lines of demarcation [among the four categories] ... are not always bright." 537 F.2d at 9.
The court further stated that "the difficulties are compounded because a term that is in one
category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another." Id. (footnote
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mark is then balanced with the remaining Polaroid factors to de-
termine the ultimate likelihood of confusion.43
The Home Box Office court held that upon a finding of likeli-
hood of confusion, the infringing party has the burden of proving a
disclaimer to be an adequate remedy." This shift of the burden of
proof was justified by the fact, inter alia, that the successful plain-
tiff had already established its right to the more severe remedy of
an absolute injunction.45 It is suggested that while the Home Box
Office court was correct in shifting the burden of proof to the in-
fringing party, it should have identified the specific burden that
party must meet."
DEFINING THE PROPER SCOPE OF APPELLATE REvIEw
The circuit courts have been inconsistent in their review of
Lanham Act injunctions, 7 disagreeing as to the nature, factual or
legal, of the "likelihood of confusion" determination.4" The Second
Circuit considers the determination as to the individual Polaroid
factors to be a question of fact, while it has viewed the weighing of
these factors and ultimate conclusions derived therefrom as a
question of law.49 Furthermore, even those portions of the analysis
deemed questions of fact have been subject to a de novo review
when the circuit court has determined that it is in as good a posi-
tion as the trial judge to decide the issue involved.50
omitted).
43 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing balancing of factors).
4 See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1315-16.
See id. at 1316.
46 See infra note 56.
'7 See supra note 8 (examples of various circuits' definitions of abuse of discretion).
Although there is general agreement among the circuits that the proper standard of review
is "abuse of discretion," there is apparently no clear statement as to the standard's parame-
ters. See id.; see also Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., 690 F.2d 312, 315 (2d Cir. 1982)
(discussing Second Circuit standard). "An abuse of discretion may consist of an error of law,
an error of fact, or an error in the substance or form of the trial court's order." Id.
41 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1130-33 (2d
Cir. 1982) (court re-examined the similarity of product labels and tags). Appellate courts in
Lanham Act cases have often chosen to review various physical evidence bearing on similar-
ity of the marks. See, e.g., McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133-34
(1979) (comparing marks "DRIZZLE" and "DRIZZLER"); American Home Prods. v. John-
son Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 107 (1978) (similarity between marks "ROACH MOTEL" and
"ROACH INN"). A justification offered for this approach is the belief of the appellate court
that such evidence can be examined with equal scrutiny at the appellate level. Miss Uni-
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The Home Box Office court, in affirming the trial court's de-
termination of a likelihood of confusion, never addressed the Po-
laroid factors.5' Although these factors are not always utilized
when the products involved are in direct competition, it is submit-
ted that the Polaroid analysis should be uniformly utilized in de-
termining the likelihood of consumer confusion.
In vacating that portion of the injunction that dealt with the
appropriateness of the disclaimer remedy, the Home Box Office
court failed to clearly state that the injunction, as granted, consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion under the established standard of re-
view.52 Rather than deal exclusively with the question of the dis-
trict court's discretion, the Home Box Office court confused
matters by examining the actual adequacy of the disclaimers in a
de novo fashion." It is submitted that in so doing, the Second Cir-
cuit missed an opportunity to incorporate its burden of proof anal-
ysis into a comprehensive scheme of review.
Among the rationales for placing the burden of proof on the
defendant as to the adequacy of a proposed disclaimer is the recog-
nition that an infringing party has no right to continue the use of
that mark until it can demonstrate that the original risk of con-
sumer confusion can be eliminated through the use of a dis-
claimer.5 4 Since the original determination of whether or not to
grant a preliminary injunction is within the trial court's discretion,
it would seem to follow logically that the decision to modify the
injunction by means of a disclaimer should also be within that
court's discretion.5 5 Furthermore, it appears that the decision of
the district court as to whether the infringing party has met its
burden of proof on this issue should be subject to the same abuse
of discretion standard of review as is the granting of the injunction
itself. The Home Box Office court, although ostensibly applying
verse, Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969); see Spring Mills, 689 F.2d at 1130.
1 See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1314-17. Nor were the Polaroid factors addressed
by the district court. See Home Box Office, 665 F. Supp. at 1083-87.
2 See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1315. The court indicated that "the record before
[them was] not sufficient to support a finding that the disclaimers ... [would have been]
effective." Id. If taken to mean that the trial court's decision was based on insufficient evi-
dence as a matter of law, such an error of law could constitute an abuse of discretion. See
Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983) (error of law can be abuse of
discretion).
s' See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1315.
See id. at 1316.




this standard, failed to sufficiently articulate it, or even to specify
clearly what the infringing party's burden on this issue should be.5 6
By including the decision of disclaimer adequacy within the
trial court's equitable discretion, the entire injunction, barring
other reversible error, would be subject to reversal only upon a
finding of abuse of discretion. Although this may seem to unduly
restrict the function of the appellate court, it does not since the
circuits are still at liberty to redefine their interpretation of
"abuse" to broaden the scope of review.57
CONCLUSION
When faced with a motion for a preliminary injunction under
section 43(a), a district court must first determine the appropriate-
ness of such a remedy by utilizing, when applicable, the appropri-
ate Polaroid factors. If such remedy is warranted, the "Home Box
Office shift" requires that the infringing party prove that the dis-
claimer it seeks to use would eliminate the likelihood of confusion
that party has caused. The decision whether to grant and how to
frame or modify such an injunction is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court.
On appeal, the circuit court's scope of review should be limited
by established judicial standards. Specifically, the trial court's
holding appertaining to injunctive relief should be subject to rever-
sal or modification only if it constituted an abuse of discretion. It
is urged that this comprehensive method would best utilize the test
11 See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1315-16. The Home Box Office court pointed out
that the district court had reached its determination as to disclaimer adequacy on the basis
of insufficient and, to an extent, improperly received evidence. See id. It is suggested, how-
ever, that by failing to state clearly that the procedures utilized constituted an abuse of
discretion, the Home Box Office court failed to clearly identify the legal rationale it was
relying upon as its basis for tampering with the district court's injunction. See supra note 52
(decision based upon insufficient evidence can be abuse of discretion as a matter of law).
With regard to the burden of proof issue, the Home Box Office court first stated that
Showtime had a burden "to come forward with evidence" of the adequacy of the disclaimer,
suggesting that the court might be creating a presumption of disclaimer inadequacy. Home
Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1316. The "burden of coming forward" is generally utilized in refer-
ence to the rebuttal of a presumption. See FED. R. EvD. 301.
Shortly thereafter, the Home Box Office court referred to Showtime's burden as a "bur-
den of proof." See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 1316. Burden of proof as to a particular
issue, or more precisely, burden of persuasion, unlike the burden of coming forward, never
shifts but remains on the same party throughout the action. See Simpson v. Home Petro-
leum Corp., 770 F.2d 499, 503-05 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law); FED. R. Evin. 301
(burden of proof remains on the party upon whom it was originally cast).
" See Friendly, supra note 8, at 767-71, 784 (discussing flexibility of abuse standard).
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of the Home Box Office court while preserving established prece-
dent and standards.
Frederick P. Alimonti
